The blackout risks of cascading failures in power systems are notably associated with the failures of transmission lines. Line capacity temporary expansion can reduce blackout risk by decreasing the line failures due to the overloads during the cascading failures. To efficiently quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks, we propose a data based state-failure-network method in this paper. The state-failure network, which is formed by the cascading failure data generated by cascading failure simulations, contains the empirical probabilities that correspond to the failure probabilities of lines. Since implementing line capacity temporary expansion to the system can change the failure probabilities of lines and reduce the blackout risk, the empirical probabilities offer the link between line capacity temporary expansion and state-failure network. By updating the values in the state-failure network with changed empirical probabilities, the blackout risk after line capacity temporary expansion is implemented can be efficiently worked out by state-failure network. Thus, the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risk is quantified by comparing the newly calculated blackout risk with the risk before the line capacity temporary expansion is implemented. The advantage of the proposed method lies in the high accuracy and efficiency of quantifying the impacts of any line capacity temporary expansion schemes once the state-failure network is formed. Case studies verify the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading failures in power systems often give rise to large blackouts and cause severe losses to modern society [1] , [2] . Most cascading failures are triggered by unintended contingencies such as natural disasters and component malfunctions, and enlarged by influence factors like successive line overloads and hidden failures in the propagation phase. Since the unintended contingencies are hard to prevent, it is more practical to intervene the cascading failure propagation where successive line outages are typically involved [3] .
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In order to prevent line outages, researchers proposed many measures, which include but not limited to vegetation management [4] , [5] , line maintenance [6] , [7] , transmission expansion [8] , [9] and relay blocking [10] , [11] . The vegetation management and line maintenance call for continuous investments on human and material resources during the operation of power systems [7] , [12] . Transmission expansion needs to consider the complex power market constraints and takes a long time to construct [13] .
In contrast, blocking the relays can rapidly intervene the cascading failure propagations. However, the resulting longtime or severe overloads of lines are still undermining the system. Hence, the blocking duration should be limited. A more VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ flexible choice is line capacity temporary expansion based on dynamic ratings [14] , [15] , which can temporarily increase the line capacity by changing the relay setting value without extra investments for building new lines. Implementing line capacity temporary expansion to lines can make the system more capable to survive blackouts, where the blackout risks of cascading failures are decreased. However, the literature do not account for the quantitative relationships between line capacities and blackout risks. It relies on the comparisons between the blackout risks after and before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented to quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks. Generally, estimating the blackout risk of power systems calls for massive cascading failure simulations. After obtaining the blackout risks before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented, the blackout risk after line capacity temporary expansion is implemented also calls for another cascading failure simulations. However, the cascading failures based on raw simulators in [16] - [19] are time-consuming. Although some techniques are introduced to accelerate the cascading failure simulations [20] , [21] , they still rely on repetitive load flow calculations. Since there are often multiple alternative line capacity temporary expansion schemes to be repeatedly quantified their impacts on blackout risks, the total time consumptions can be unacceptable. Therefore, a more efficient way to estimate the blackout risk is needed.
To improve the efficiency for obtaining the blackout risks after line capacity temporary expansion is implemented, another way using cascading failures data to form data based models has been proposed in the literature [22] - [24] . In order to quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks, the proper data based model should be able to accurately figure out the blackout risks after the line capacities are expanded. However, since the models in [22] , [23] do not take load losses into account, they cannot quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks. The method in [24] considers load losses but leaves out line flows which are essential to recalculate the line failure probabilities, so it cannot achieve the quantification. The algorithm in [25] quantifies the impact of line failure probability on blackout risks, where the probability changes caused by line maintenance are mild. As a matter of fact, line capacity temporary expansion can bring about much larger variances to failure probabilities than line maintenance. Therefore, the algorithm in [25] can lead to inaccurate blackout risk assessments when quantifying the impacts of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks.
To address the issue of efficiently quantifying the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks, this paper proposes an algorithm based on the state-failurenetwork method illustrated in [24] . In addition to the failure sequences and final losses that are essential to form the original state-failure network in [24] , the line flows and load losses at each failure level are recorded to supplement the state-failure network. Thus, state-failure network is able to obtain accurate blackout risk estimations after the line capacity temporary expansion is implemented. Moreover, as the algebraic calculations in the state-failure network are much quicker than load flow calculations, the efficiency of statefailure network can be superior to those of simulation based methods.
The major contribution of this paper is the proposed method which can quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks efficiently and accurately. Due to the complexity of cascading failure dynamics and strong nonlinearity, optimizing the line capacity temporary expansion schemes can hardly be achieved by an analytical way. Thus, this method offers a reliable tool to efficiently achieve the analyses based on heuristic optimization algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the basic concepts and value calculation algorithm of the state-failure-network method, and illustrates the information supplement of the state-failure network. The formulation of line capacity temporary expansion and the quantification of the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks are described in Section III. At last, the cases in Section IV discuss the performance of line capacity temporary expansion, and validate the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method.
II. THE DATA BASED STATE-FAILURE-NETWORK METHOD A. CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATOR
The cascading failure is simulated by a DC power flow based simulator, which is similar to that in [24] , [26] . The procedures are simply illustrated as below:
Step 1: Input the power system initial operation point.
Step 2: Set initiating contingency to trigger a cascading failure.
Step 3: Detect islands. If no new island is detected, go to
Step 4. Otherwise, rebalance the generation and loads in each island by ramping generators [27] . If generator rampings cannot cover the power mismatch, trip generators or shed loads until power balance is reached.
Step 4: Calculate power flow and check whether the load flow of any line exceeds its capacity. If yes, go to
Step 5, otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 5: Calculate the failure probability of each line based on the widely used failure probability model [28] , [29] given as below
where p m , p c m and p max m are the load flow, load capacity and capacity limit of line l m respectively. Generally, p max m = 1.4p c m , thus the left side of (1) leaves out the item p max m . When multiple lines are overloaded, select one line to trip according to the Roulette-Wheel algorithm [28] , [30] . If line tripping happens, append this failure to the cascading failure chain and go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 6: The cascade ends. Record the cascading failure chain, and count the load loss as the result of the cascading failure chain. In this simulator, hidden failures are not taken into account and the generation re-dispatches are assumed to rely on automatic generation control, which are free of line capacity constraints [24] , [27] , [31] .
B. BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE STATE-FAILURE NETWORK
The cascading failure simulations produce the cascading failure chains to form the state-failure network.
Firstly, the states and failures should be obtained. A k-length cascading failure chain comprising of the failure sequence {f (1) , f (2) , . . . , f (k) } and final loss is as
where the subscripts in brackets are the occurrence order of the failures. Then the states, which indicate operating statuses of transmission lines at each failure level, are denoted as vectors s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k . Recombine the states and corresponding failures as a tuple sequence:
where f 0 is the ending mark of a failure chain. The subscripts of the state vectors are the stage numbers, which also say the failure levels.
Secondly, use nodes and edges to signify the states and failures respectively. Join the nodes and edges based on the tuple sequences as in Fig. 1 . With amounts of tuple sequences, we can get the form of the state-failure network as illustrated in Fig. 2 , where s k(j) is the jth state at stage k and f m is the failure of line l m . As seen in the figure, the state-failure network originates at the initial state s 0 , spreads along the subsequent states and failures, and terminates at the states with f 0 . In state-failure network, the occurrence numbers of the states and failures are recorded. When new cascading failure chains are added in, the corresponding numbers are increased by the number of new cascading failure chains. Based on the numbers of failures and f 0 , the states in state-failure network can be classified into three types as below 
where S f k(j) is the set of f 0 and failures that occur at s k(j) . Then the state value of s k(j) , S(s k(j) ), is derived from
where F(s k(j) , f m ) is the failure value of f m at s k(j) . b) failure value calculation: The failure value of a failure f m equals to the state value of its next state, which is denoted as s k+1(·) . The failure value of f 0 equals to the total loss of the system at s k(j) . Thus,
c) Value calculation: The value calculation starts where the losses are recorded, and performs successively from the larger stages to smaller ones (from right to left in Fig. 2 ). The algorithm can be briefly illustrated as below
Step 1: Get the failure value of f 0 at the backmost state at the maximal stage in state-failure network according to (4) . Then, the state value of the backmost state equals the failure value of the f 0 according to (2) and (3) since here N s ·(·) = N (s ·(·) ,f 0 ) .
Step 2: Move a stage forward. According to (4) , the failure values of the failures all equal to the state values of their next states, which have been obtained at the previous step. Then, the state value of the states at the current stage are worked out based on (3).
Step 3: Continue the calculation until stage 0.
Then the state value of s 0 is finally worked out. After the state-failure network value calculation, every state and failure gets a value that quantifies the expected loss after its occurrence. In particular, S(s 0 ) equals to the blackout risk of the system.
D. EMPIRICAL PROBABILITIES OF LINE FAILURES IN THE STATE-FAILURE NETWORK
The fraction coefficient in right side of (3) is the empirical probability of f m at s k(j) in the state-failure network. Thus, we have
where N is the number of cascading failure chains that form the state-failure network.
The empirical probabilities of f m are related to the line failure probability Pr fail m (p m , p c m ) in (1) . If Pr fail m (p m , p c m ) drops due to line capacity expansion, N (s k(j) ,f m ) will decrease in the state-failure network and Pr em N (f m |s k(j) ) drops accordingly. This positive correlation between Pr em N (f m |s k(j) ) and Pr fail m (p m , p c m ) offers the basis to quantify the impact of line capacity expansion on the empirical probabilities in the statefailure network.
Once the empirical probabilities change, the values in the state-failure network should be recalculated based on the value calculation algorithm in Section II-C. Afterwards, the recalculated state value of s 0 , which indicates the blackout risk after line capacity expansion, can be obtained. In summary, the empirical probabilities in the state-failure network is the key to quantify the impact of line capacity expansion on blackout risks.
E. INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTED TO THE STATE-FAILURE NETWORK
In order to achieve the calculation of the state-failure network after line capacity expansions, two kinds of information are added to the original state-failure network proposed in [24] :
1) LOAD FLOWS AT EACH STATE
It calls for the load flows of the lines to calculate the line failure probabilities after capacity changes according to Section II-D. However, the original state-failure network is lack of load flow information. Thus, the load flows of the lines at each state are added to the state-failure network.
2) LOAD LOSSES AT EACH STATE
The load losses of cascading failure chains are recorded at the terminal and hybrid states in the original state-failure network, while the passing states are lack of load loss information. If the empirical probabilities of the failures at a passing state all drop to zero due to line capacity expansion, the state value of the state will also drop to zero according to (3) . However, if there are load losses at the states that are not recorded in the state-failure network, the value calculation will lead to inaccurate results. Thus, load losses at each state are recorded along the cascading failure chains.
Meanwhile, the passing states are added f 0 whose failure values equal to the load losses at the states. The newly added f 0 do not change the state value calculation results in (3) before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented.
The supplemented information, which can be gathered during cascading failure simulations, only takes some extra storage and does not change the structure and value calculation of the state-failure network.
III. QUANTIFY THE IMPACT OF LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION ON BLACKOUT RISKS BY THE STATE-FAILURE NETWORK A. LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION FORMULATION
In a line capacity temporary expansion scheme, the capacities of lines are temporarily expanded within a duration. In this paper, the duration of line capacity temporary expansion is the number of covered stages/failure levels, which is denoted as N T . Because the measures to reduce blackout risks should be taken as soon as possible to prevent further losses in the cascading failure processes, the implemented line capacity temporary expansion schemes are assumed to work at the first N T stages.
Let lines l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n be expanded u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n MW respectively in a line capacity temporary expansion scheme, and denote the lines and expanded capacities as vectors l and u. Then, (u, l) can stand for a line capacity temporary expansion scheme.
During the N T stages, the line capacity temporary expansion scheme (u, l) temporarily expands line l m by u m MW, which results in lower failure probability of line l m according to (1) . Thus, the line capacity temporary expansion implemented to line l m is modeled as
where p k(j) is the load flow vector at state s k(j) .
B. FAILURE PROBABILITY CALCULATION WITH LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION
The implementation of line capacity temporary expansion changes the line failure probabilities, which should be calculated before the state-failure network value calculation. Since it is assumed that only one line trips at a stage during the cascading failures, the actual line failure probabilities, which are derived from Roulette-Wheel algorithm [30] based on line failure probabilities in (6) , can be different from the line failure probability. Let n o k(j) be the number of overloaded lines at s k(j) , and S o k(j) be the set of the n o k(j) lines. Then, denote the actual failure probability of line l m after the line capacity temporary expansion scheme (u, l) is implemented as Pr act m (u, l), p k(j) . For simplicity, (u, l), p k(j) is written as (·) in this subsection.
Before discussing Pr act m (·)(l m ∈ S o k(j) ), we calculate the actual probability of f 0 , which indicates the probability of no failure occurrence, by
Obviously, when n o k(j) = 1, from (7) we have Pr act 0 (·) = 1 − Pr fail m (·).
Thus, the actual probability of failure occurrences equals to 1 − Pr act 0 (·). Then, based on the Roulette-Wheel algorithm, the actual failure probability of an arbitrary line l m is derived from Pr act m (·) = 1 − Pr act 0 (·)
Pr fail i (·)
.
When n o k(j) = 1, from (8) and (9) we can have Pr act m (·) = Pr fail m (·).
From (7) and (9), we can obtain the conservation of probabilities as
which holds at each states during the state-failure network value calculation.
C. STATE-FAILURE NETWORK VALUE CALCULATION WITH LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION
The actual failure probabilities derived from (7) and (9) correspond to the empirical probabilities in state-failure network derived from (5) . According to the law of large numbers, we can have the equation as below before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented
Then, after line capacity temporary expansion is implemented to line l m , the equation is as
where the apostrophe on the right side indicates that the items are the parameters after line capacity temporary expansion is implemented. Without causing confusion, we leave out the limit denotation in the ideal context where N → ∞ hereafter. At a certain state in the state-failure network, different load flows and losses could be recorded due to the various previous cascading failure paths. As the failure probabilities can differ based on different load flows, the calculation should be dealt with respectively. In the state-failure-network, the similar load flow values are recorded in a group. Let p i k(j) be the ith load flow group at s k(j) . The failure probabilities are firstly calculated as in (5) and (13) respectively in the different load flow groups. Then the results of the groups are multiplied by the weights of the load flow groups, which are obtained by
where
is the corresponding occurrence numbers. At last, the results are summed before being substituted into (3) .
After substituting the calculated probabilities into (5) and (3), and calculating the state values and failure values as illustrated in Section II-C, the state value of s 0 after (u, l) is implemented, which is denoted as S(s 0 , (u, l) ), can be derived. Let R SF (u, l) be the blackout risk estimated by the state-failure network after (u, l) is implemented, then (u, l) ).
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D. QUANTIFY THE IMPACT OF LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION ON BLACKOUT RISKS
We quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks by the ratio of blackout risk after and before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented. Then, let r SF (u, l) be the ratio derived from state-failure network value calculation and
The smaller r SF (u, l) means that the line capacity temporary expansion scheme can reduce more blackout risks, which indicates better performance of the line capacity temporary expansion scheme. In this paper, the blackout risk ratios are written in a percentage form and abbreviated as blackout risk percentage hereafter. In order to validate the results of the state-failure network, we similarly obtain the ratio by cascading failure simulation which is defined as
where the CFS in the superscript is abbreviation of cascading failure simulation. It is expected that (16) = (17). However, the condition that N → ∞ is impractical and thus (16) = (17). We measure the blackout risk percentage errors by ε(u, l) = r SF (u, l) − r CFS (u, l) .
When ε(u, l) is small enough, N is sufficient and the statefailure network value calculation results are reliable. It can be seen from (16) and (17) that a quantification calls for twice blackout risk estimations. Since the algebraic calculations in the state-failure network is much quicker than the load flow calculations in cascading failure simulations, the state-failure-network method will sharply cut down the time consumptions for subsequent blackout risk estimations after the state-failure network is formed.
E. OPTIMAL LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION SCHEME TO REDUCE BLACKOUT RISKS
The optimization problem to achieve optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme is formulated as
The inequality (19b) represents that the expanded capacities are within safety requirements, where α i is the maximum expansion factor of line l i . The inequality (19c) shows the capacity expansion investment constraints, where c is the unit expansion cost vector of the lines and C is the given total cost budget.
The state-failure network value calculation cannot offer an explicit function between line capacity temporary expansion and blackout risks. However, since the time consumption of the calculation is acceptably short, the heuristic algorithms like the particle swarm optimization algorithm (PSO) can be chosen to solve the problem as (19) .
In addition, we also use cascading failure risks as the benchmark by substituting r SF (u, l) in (19a) by r CFS (u, l) to validate the derived optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme.
The operators firstly form the state-failure network by the simulation data of the power systems, then the proposed method can be used to efficiently obtain the optimal line capacity temporary expansion schemes and the corresponding blackout risk changes. With the obtained consequences, the operators can set the proper parameters of the dynamic rating components to implement the line capacity temporary expansion to mitigate the blackout risk.
IV. CASE STUDY
In case study, the IEEE 39-bus test system and IEEE 118-bus test system are used to verify the validity and efficiency of the method. The data of the both systems can be accessed from [32] . The cases are tested in MATLAB on a personal computer with 14-core 2.00GHz processor and 64GB RAM. (1) and (6) . Random N-2 contingencies trigger the cascading failures. The blackout risk changes during three runs of cascading failure simulations are shown in Fig. 4 , which indicates that 30000 cascading failure chains are enough to get an accurate blackout risk estimation and the blackout risk before line capacity temporary expansion is implemented R CFS (0, l) = 423MW. Form the state-failure network based on the 30000 cascading failure chains. The method in [24] identifies the lines 3, 42, 38 and 13 as the most critical four lines of the IEEE 39-bus system. And the cases in [24] show that expanding these critical lines can achieve the maximal blackout risk decreases. Thus, we implement line capacity temporary expansion to these critical lines rather than to other lines.
To set a proper line capacity temporary expansion duration N T , we select lines 3 and 42 to implement line capacity temporary expansion with different N T , where each line is expanded 200MW. The blackout risk results derived from cascading failures are shown in Fig. 5 . It can be seen that larger N T can result in lower blackout risk when N T ≤ 6, which shows that longer line capacity temporary expansion duration can achieve better performance. However, the performance does not improve as N T gets larger than 6, which can result from that the failure values of the lines get closer to the state values as the stage becomes larger, and that the average numbers of the overloaded lines at the states increase as the stage becomes larger. Besides, it can be noticed that the blackout risks rise at some stages in the figure, which mainly results from the fluctuations of estimated risks by the random simulations.
Besides, we analyze lengthes of the cascading failure chain recorded by a real power system [33] and the cascading failure simulations of the IEEE 39-bus system. The percentages of the cascading failure chains of different lengthes among the data are given in Table. 1. It can be seen that more than 95% of the cascading failure chains are no longer than 6 failures, and only a little proportion of cascading failure chains are long chains in the two groups of data. In summary, the line capacity temporary expansion schemes with N T = 6 can cover the majority of cascading failure processes and achieve relatively better performances in the IEEE 39-bus system. Hence, we set N T = 6 in this case.
1) LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION PERFORMANCE ON SINGLE LINES
We firstly implement single line line capacity temporary expansion schemes to lines 3, 42, 38 and 13 respectively, and the results are in Fig. 6 . In the figure, r SF (u, l) and r CFS (u, l) obtained by the state-failure network and cascading failure simulations respectively are both gathered to validate the accuracy of the proposed state-failure-network method, which is written as SF-based method for simplicity hereafter.
It can be seen in Fig. 6(a) that the results from SF-based method share the same tendencies of those from cascading failure simulations. The blackout risk percentage errors ε(u, l) ). ε(u, l) are shown in Fig. 6(b) . Since the errors are all less than 3%, the accuracy of the SF-based method is validated.
In addition to verifying the accuracy, the results also indicate the characteristics of line capacity temporary expansion performance. In Fig. 6(a) , as the expanded capacities of the lines raise up, the blackout risk quickly drops down at first and gets slower after certain values, which can be seen as the line capacity temporary expansion performance limits of the lines. Such as line 3, the blackout risk keeps decreasing linearly as the expanded capacity raises up before 200MW and decreases much slower afterwards. Besides, the line capacity temporary expansion performance limits also differ among the lines. For instance, the line capacity temporary expansion performance limit of line 3 is about 200MW, while that of line 42 is about 300MW. To better reveal the differences of line capacity temporary expansion performance limits, the distributions of line overloads before failures are given in Fig. 7 . In the figure, the distributions of lines 3 and 13 show that most of their overloads before failures are lower than 200MW. That is to say, when lines 3 and 13 are expanded more than 200MW in the line capacity temporary expansion schemes, they can survive the majority of power fluctuations during cascading failures. Correspondingly, the line capacity temporary expansion performance limits of lines 3 and 13 are about 200MW as shown in Fig. 6(a) . For lines 42 and 38, their larger line capacity temporary expansion performance limits also result from their distributions of larger overloads as in Fig. 7 . The performance of the line capacity temporary expansion can be also seen on the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) of the load losses as shown in Fig. 8 . It can be clearly seen that line capacity temporary expansion can considerably decrease the probabilities of high-loss blackouts. Moreover, line capacity temporary expansion performances can vary with expanded capacities. According to the results in [24] , lines 42 and 38 are more critical than line 13, which indicates that implementing line capacity temporary expansion to line 42 or 38 can reduce more blackout risk than to line 13. However, this indication only holds when the lines are expanded more than 400MW. When the lines are only allowed to be expanded no more than 100MW, line 13 can be more critical than lines 42 and 38. This phenomenon also indicates the necessity to quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks.
2) LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION PERFORMANCE ON MULTIPLE LINES
To validate the SF-based method when line capacity temporary expansion is implemented to multiple lines, we select lines 3 and 42 to expand their capacities simultaneously. The results obtained from SF-based method and cascading failure risks are given in Fig. 9(a) . It is clear that r SF (u, l) and r CFS (u, l) still share the same tendencies in multiple line capacity temporary expansion situations. The errors ε(u, l) are all less than 3% as shown in Fig. 9(b) . Moreover, the results also indicate nonlinearity of line capacity temporary expansion performances where multiple line line capacity temporary expansion results cannot be obtained by adding single-line results. To show the indications, two groups of points are chosen to compare the decrease of blackout risk percentage. For the one group of points {r CFS 1 , r CFS 2 , r CFS 3 } which refer to that line 42 is expanded 60MW, line 3 is expanded 60MW and both lines are expanded 60MW simultaneously. 100% − r CFS 3 = 21.75% and (100% − r CFS 2 ) − (100% − r CFS 1 ) = 27.01%, where the error is 5.25%. The other group of points {r CFS 4 , r CFS 5 , r CFS 6 } correspond to the situation of expanding 150MW, where the the error raises up to 12.72%. The study in [25] also demonstrates the nonlinear relationship between line outage probabilities and blackout risks.
3) OPTIMAL LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION SCHEME
Although the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks can be accurately quantified by the SF-based method, there is still no explicit function form for (19a). Thus, we select the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm to solve the problem in (19) . In order to avoid falling into local optimum, we repeat PSO with 50 particles for 3 times to verify the optimal line capacity temporary expansion schemes Let l = [3, 42, 38, 13] T . Without loss of generality, we set α i = 0.2, c i =$1/MW(i = 1, 2, 3, 4), and C = $550. We test PSO on SF-based method and cascading failure simulations (CFS) to verify the optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme and compare the time consumptions, where the results of CFS PSO are the benchmark. The optimal line capacity temporary expansion schemes and blackout risk percentage are given in Table. 2, where the optimal schemes derived by the both PSO are highly similar. Meanwhile, the difference of blackout risk percentage is 1.60%, which is small. We compare the time consumptions of CFS PSO and SF-based PSO. Firstly, it takes about 204s to estimate the original blackout risks by cascading failure simulations as well as gathering the cascading failure data to form the statefailure network. Thereafter, another cascading failures will also call for about 204s to quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks, whereas SF-based method only takes about 1s. Then, the SF-based PSO only spends about 410s (204s to produce the data and 206s to finish the PSO) to get the optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme, which is about 49 times faster than the cascading failure simulation based PSO (about 20132s), indicating the prominent efficiency of the proposed method.
Moreover, we analyze the optimal results given different total cost budgets. Fig. 10 shows the changes of the expanded capacities of the four lines. It can be seen that the results derived from SF-based PSO and CFS PSO are almost the same. As the maximum expansion factors of lines are small, the expansions show an obvious prioritization, where line 3, 13, 38 and 42 are successively expanded to their maximum expansions. This order is partly consistent with the single line line capacity temporary expansion results in Section IV-A1, in which expanding line 13 can be more effective than expanding line 42 or line 38 given small expanded capacities. However, the order of lines 42 and 38 exchanges, which is because the nonlinearity and complexity of cascading failures. The corresponding blackout risk percentage of the both PSO are given in Fig. 11 , which also shows the accuracy of the SF-based method. 
B. CASE 2: IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
Since there are no transmission line limits available in the data [32] , the line capacity limits are set that p m,c = max{1.2 p m,0 , 200} [31] , where p m,0 is the load flow of line l m at the base system operation point. To accelerate the cascading failure simulations of IEEE 118-bus system, the N-2 contingencies are limited in the most topologically vulnerable lines, which are lines 8, 37, 96 and 104 as figured out by the method in [34] .
The blackout risk changes during three runs of cascading failure simulations are shown in Fig. 12 , which indicates that 50000 cascading failure chains can accurately estimate the blackout risks. Thus, we use 50000 cascading failure chains to form the state-failure network, which identifies lines 33, 98, 99 and 31 as the most critical lines by the method in [24] . We select lines 33 and 98 to implement line capacity temporary expansion with different N T , where each line is expanded 400MW. The performances are shown in Fig. 13 , where larger N T of line capacity temporary expansion also results in lower blackout risks. It can be seen that blackout risks stop their rapid decreases after N T > 7. Similarly to Section IV-A, we find that 95.85% of the cascading failure chains are no longer than 7 failures. Thus, we set N T = 7 in this case. 
1) LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION PERFORMANCE ON SINGLE LINES
We implement single line line capacity temporary expansion schemes to lines 33, 98, 99 and 31 respectively. Fig. 14(a) shows the results of r SF (u, l) and r CFS (u, l), which also share the same tendencies. As the errors shown in Fig. 14(b) are all less than 3%, the accuracy of the SF-based method is validated. (u, l) ).
Meanwhile, the nonlinearity between line capacity temporary expansion and blackout risks can be also noticed in this case, especially for lines 98 and 99. Since lines 98 and 99 are a pair of parallel lines, their line capacity temporary expansion performances are similar. Also, we draw the distributions of line overloads before failures in Fig. 15 . Most of the overloads of lines 33 and 99 are smaller than 400MW and 300MW respectively, which are consistent with the corresponding line capacity temporary expansion performance limits in Fig. 14(a) . However, besides their distributions, it still calls for the detailed analyses of losses caused by the failures to account for the nonlinearity between line capacity temporary expansion and blackout risks from 0-300MW, which will be pursued in our future work. The CCDF of the load losses with different line capacity temporary expansion schemes are shown in Fig. 16 , where more expanded capacities can lead to lower loss probabilities. 
2) LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION PERFORMANCE ON MULTIPLE LINES
In this case, we select lines 33 and 98 to implement multiple line line capacity temporary expansion schemes. The results obtained from cascading failure simulations and SF-based method are given in Fig. 17(a) , where both results share the same tendency as the expanded capacities raise up. Fig. 17(b) shows that all the errors are less than 3%, which validates the accuracy of the SF-based method.
3) OPTIMAL LINE CAPACITY TEMPORARY EXPANSION SCHEME
Because the performance of line capacity temporary expansion on line 31 is mild as shown in Fig. 14(a) , we only implement the line capacity temporary expansion on lines 33, 98 and 99. In this case, l = [33, 98, 99] T , α i = 2, c =$1/MW(i = 1, 2, 3), and C = $600. The other settings are same as those in Section IV-A3. It takes about 3076s to obtain the optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme u = [378.63, 117.67, 103.61] T by the SF-based PSO, and r SF (u, l) = 26.17%. The SFbased method takes about 4.6s to calculate the blackout risks after the line capacity temporary expansion is implemented, whereas the cascading failure simulations calls for more than 1700s. Hence, estimating the blackout risk of the IEEE 118-bus system by the cascading failure simulations for once takes about 366 times longer than by the statefailure network. As SF-based PSO takes about 1 hour to obtain the optimal line capacity temporary expansion scheme, the consumed time by the CFS PSO is expected to be more than 13 days, which makes the CFS PSO infeasible. The corresponding r CFS (u, l) = 27.51%. And it also validates the effectiveness of the proposed method that ε(u, l) = 1.34%.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a data based state-failure-network method to quantify the impact of line capacity temporary expansion on blackout risks and optimize the line capacity temporary expansion schemes. The algebraic calculations in the state-failure network value calculation can dramatically decrease the time consumptions than conventional cascading failure simulation methods. Based on the state-failurenetwork method, the non-linear characteristics of the line capacity temporary expansion and blackout risks can be well reflected. The numerical experiments validate that the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method. The proposed method can help the operators to efficiently obtain the optimal parameters for the line capacity temporary expansion and dynamic ratings in the power systems to mitigate the blackout risks.
Our future work includes the application of the proposed method in more complicated scenarios to optimize the measures to reduce blackout risks, and using less data to achieve analyses of the same accuracy.
